Amid a deepening energy crisisโcharacterised by declining domestic gas production and skyrocketing LNG importsโthe United States has emerged as a dominant influencer in Bangladesh.
Reports and sources indicate that Washington is exerting significant leverage to secure lucrative gas exploration contracts for American firms like Chevron and ExxonMobil, both onshore and offshore in the resource-rich Bay of Bengal.
This push, critics argue, is not merely economic but part of a broader geopolitical strategy to establish a US military foothold in the region, countering China’s growing influence.
Drawing from recent developments, this article examines the intricate web of lobbying, contractual manoeuvres, and strategic posturing that could reshape Bangladesh’s sovereignty and energy landscape.
The Energy Crunch: A Vulnerable Backdrop
Bangladesh’s energy sector is in dire straits. Domestic gas production from 22 onshore fields, operated by a mix of local and foreign entities, hovers between 1,800 and 2,000 million cubic feet per day, far short of the national demand, which exceeds 3,000 million cubic feet.
Fields like Bibiyana, Jalalabad, and Moulvibazarโlargely run by Chevronโsupply over 55% of the grid’s needs but are depleting rapidly. At Bibiyana, recoverable reserves stand at 7.66 trillion cubic feet (TCF), with only 1.25 TCF remaining, enough for about four years at current rates. Similar declines plague other sites, forcing reliance on costly LNG imports that drained $5 billion in foreign currency last year alone.
The interim government’s response has been to accelerate foreign involvement. In January 2025, it signed a non-binding agreement with US-based Argent LNG for up to five million metric tonnes of LNG annually from a Louisiana facility, marking the first major US deal post-Trump’s inauguration.
This aligns with Trump’s executive actions to boost LNG exports by lifting export license pauses. Yet, experts like energy analyst Shamsul Alam warn that such imports exacerbate the trade deficit and foreign exchange crunch, urging instead the bolstering of state firms like BAPEX for onshore exploration.
Under Hasina’s Awami League, a policy barred handing onshore blocks to foreigners, except for limited Chevron extensions near Bibiyana at the regime’s twilight.
The Yunus administration, however, has reversed course, mobilising Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) for inland blocks despite no electoral mandate. Petrobangla, the state oil and gas corporation, has drafted a new PSC tying gas prices to 8.5% of Brent crudeโcurrently $5.61 per thousand cubic feet at $66.10/barrel Brent, up from the prior fixed $2.50-$3. This could inflate costs by 80-100%, passing the burden to consumers amid recent hikes in fertiliser and industrial gas prices.
Alam decries this as “treasonous,” arguing it abandons BAPEX and invites undue foreign control. “Handing onshore gas to multinationals while importing LNG is suicidal,” he told Bangla Tribune. Petrobangla’s PSC Director, Md. Shoaib insists prices will remain below offshore rates, with tenders eyed by year-end. But with elections looming, sceptics question the haste, seeing it as yielding to external demands.
Chevron’s Leverage: From Blackmail to Block Bids
At the epicentre is Chevron, the US giant entrenched in Bangladesh since 1995. Producing 1,120 million cubic feet daily from three fields, it has wielded payment delays as a cudgel. In August 2024, amid dollar shortages under Hasina, $240 million in dues lingered, prompting Chevron to suspend a $500 million Jalalabad compressor projectโvital for recovering 352 billion cubic feet of gas.
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The firm demanded full arrears plus $30 million in penalties (Tk366 crore), paid by September, despite the interim government’s cash-strapped transition.
Petrobangla sources describe this as “arrogance,” noting Chevron’s history of extracting benefits over three decades. Geologist Badrul Imam calls it unethical: “Multinationals must weather political flux; this is blackmail.” Even after payments, Chevron delayed, citing instability, though senior executives met Yunus on December 3, 2024, reaffirming “long-standing partnership.”
By March 2025, Chevron bid for onshore Block-11 development and extensions in Block-12, targeting the Surma Basin’s untapped reserves. Petrobangla has yet to decide, having rejected a prior Rashidpur proposal at 10% Brent pricing. Critics fear approval would grant Chevron de facto control, prioritising profits over national needs.
Offshore, Chevron eyes the 24 blocks (15 deep-sea, 11 shallow) opened post-2012/2014 maritime delimitations with India and Myanmar. It purchased multi-client survey data from Petrobangla, signalling intent.
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Yet, past efforts faltered: ConocoPhillips, Santos, and Posco Daewoo exited after 2010-2020 due to unmet price hikes. Only India’s ONGC persists in shallow blocks. The new PSC-2024 scraps fixed prices for 10% Brent linkage ($8 per thousand cubic feet at $80/barrel), slashing Petrobangla’s profit share from 55-80% to 35-65% after costs. Energy Secretary Nurul Alam hails it as the “world’s third-most attractive,” but at what cost to sovereignty?
ExxonMobil and Excelerate: Lobbying Through the โHaas Effectโ
ExxonMobil’s overtures predate Yunus. In March and July 2024, it sought 15 deep-sea blocks, pledging $25-30 billion sans tenderโa non-starter for Hasina’s government, wary of special provisions. State Minister Nasrul Hamid insisted on bidding; ExxonMobil’s February 2025 Dhaka visit yielded no commitment, but Petrobangla’s March 2025 tender invite targeted 26 blocks, drawing 55 firms including ExxonMobil, Chevron, and China’s Sinopac.
No bids materialised by October 2025, echoing 2016’s flop, which was blamed on uncompetitive terms. Yet, amendmentsโapproved by Hasina in July 2024โnow lure investors, with tenders extended.
Enter Peter Haas, US Ambassador (2022-2024), accused by Hasina of engineering her ouster over St. Martin’s Island refusal. Post-retirement in September 2024, Haas joined Excelerate Energy as a strategic advisor. Excelerate, supplying 34% of Bangladesh’s gas via two Maheshkhali floating terminals, signed a 15-year, Tk1 lakh crore LNG deal in November 2023 under Awami Leagueโretained by Yunus despite cancellations elsewhere, citing “legal obligations.”
Haas’s April 8, 2025, meeting with Yunus at Jamuna Guest House, alongside Excelerate’s Steven Kobos, pushed expansions. Kobos, US-Bangladesh Business Council chair, hailed Yunus for boosting confidence, vowing to make decarbonization investments. By October 15, 2024, Haas accompanied Kobos again, discussing LNG scaling.
September 2025 spot buys from Aramco and Ganbar (Tk1,000 crore total) underscore the import frenzy.
Sheikh Hasina alleged Haas’s “deep state” role in the July 2024 unrest, linking it to base demands. Excelerate’s moves, per critics, exemplify “Haas diplomacy”โblending diplomacy with corporate gain, securing undue benefits amid crisis.
Geopolitical Flashpoint: A Base in the Bay?
This energy push unfolds against US ambitions for Bay of Bengal dominance. The region, funnelling 25% of global trade via the Malacca Strait, pits the US Indo-Pacific strategy against China’s Belt and Road. Beijing’s Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar and $1.21 billion submarine base in Cox’s Bazar (inaugurated in 2023) heighten tensions.
Hasina’s fall, she claimed, stemmed from rejecting a US airbase on St. Martin’s Islandโ3 sq km coral at Bay’s apex, ideal for surveillance. Under Yunus, US military inroads accelerated: 120 personnel in Chittagong for Pacific Angel 25-3 and Tiger Lightning-2025 exercises in September 2025, with C-130J landings.
A February 2025 logistics base near Teknaf hints at staging for Myanmar ops, per CIA-DGFI briefings.
India frets over Northeast vulnerabilities; Myanmar eyes Arakan Army advances. The US Navy sees Bangladesh as a “logistics node” for China containment, per the Proceedings journal. X posts echo fears: “US wants base via Yunus asset.” A September 2025 offensive window against the Myanmar junta could cement US presence, blending humanitarian cover with strategic gain.
National Interests vs. Foreign Gains: A Treacherous Path
US pressureโvia Haas’s lobbying, Chevron’s coercion, ExxonMobil’s bids, and Excelerate’s dealsโyields corporate windfalls at Bangladesh’s expense. Onshore PSC awards risk-inflating prices without BAPEX empowerment; offshore tenders, unbid despite lures, expose PSC flaws. Amid $167 million in US aid for Myanmar ethnic groups, the Bay risks becoming a “geopolitical flashpoint.”
Yunus’ overtures to US investors, welcoming 50 Business Council firms, signal openness. But as Imam notes, “Competitive tenders are key, but delays favour incumbents.” With elections uncertain, the interim regime must prioritise audits, BAPEX revival, and transparent bidding to avert “treason” Alam warns of.
Ultimately, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads: succumbing to pressure invites exploitation and bases that entangle it in the US-China rivalry, eroding autonomy. Resisting demands strategic fortitudeโleveraging BIMSTEC, diversifying partners, and harnessing domestic potential. The Bay’s bounty should fuel national resurgence, not foreign hegemony. As geopolitical storms brew, Dhaka’s choices will echo across the Indo-Pacific.
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